Canton-Hankow railway是粤汉铁路。 广东到湖北的铁路。 应该说广州到汉口。
光绪二十二年，上谕让修。光绪二十六年动工。 干了36年完工。这效率哈。
这条铁路有关的牛人太多。 盛宣怀借钱。老百姓反对。 借款675万美元啊。 伍廷芳 法学大家。张之洞 香帅搞斗争。 搞到清朝灭亡。后再借550万英镑。修到北洋政府倒台了。 民国二十五年才修好天呢！
其中还经历了粤汉铁路工人大罢工。
似乎是跑题了。不能再扯铁路了。这篇文章本来想扯pekin syndicate这家牛b公司呢。 变成扯大清铁路的文章了。
这时候中堂已死。Pekin Syndicate在大清没什么强有力的靠山。不退出不行。
Tszechau 我竟然不知道在哪，用google去搜只有一条结果。说在山西。 nanking 是南京。 yangtse应该是长江的扬子江。应该是把山西的煤和矿运到沿海。好想法大工程啊。
通过李白的这首诗，我才知道 ching-ting在哪。 在安徽敬亭山。
独坐敬亭山
By 李白 (Li Bai)
众鸟高飞尽，孤云独去闲。
相看两不厌，只有敬亭山。
Sitting Alone in Ching-Ting Mountain
Li Po
Translated by Irving Y. Lo
Flocks of birds fly high and vanish;
A single cloud, alone, calmly drifts on.
Never tired of looking at each other -
Only the Ching-Ting Mountain and me.
转篇不错的论文吧。 英文太差看了快一个半小时才把这篇论文看完。
格式有问题。 可以下载有格式的PDF.
p0113-p0122
http://www.qingchao.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/p0113-p0122.pdf
Joint Venture in China: The Experience of the Pekin Syndicate, 1897-1961
Frank H.H. King 1
University of Hong Kong and New Mexico Military Institute The Pekin Syndicate Ltd, as initially conceived and incorporated in 1897 was a f’mancial venture designed to obtain concessions from China and to promote these, as and when obtained, in the form of separate companies. Angelo Luzzatti, the Syndicate’s agent, was uniquely successful in his negotiations with the Shansi and Honan provincial authorities; he obtained the coal and iron mining rights with a related railroad concession covering an area of 21,000 square miles [6]. Figures in the range of 900,000 million tons of coal were estimated with expected annual profits of œ750,000–and yet in its 65 years as the Pekin Syndicate the company paid but one half-year’s dividend–in 1936 [1, 8]. All had been procedurally correct. The terms were duly agreed by the governors, subsequently authorized by Imperial edict, supported by the influential Viceroy Li Hung-chang, ratified by the Tsungli Yamen (the Chinese equivalent of a foreign ministry), and registered with the British Legation in Peking. As the Syndicate’s Agent General in China would later argue, ”Could legalization be more definite, more solid, or fixed by a higher mandate than this?” [2, FO 371/26, f. 189]. As the terms of the concessions prevented their alienation, the Pekin Syndicate became 2Perforce an industrial company with an appropriate increase in capital. The subsequent history of the Syndicate is complex. 1This essay is part of my longer study of the Pekin Syndicate; the project is administered by the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong. 2In consequence, the capital of the Pekin Syndicate became: Authorized, œ1,540,000 in 1,500,000 ”Shansi” shares and 39,900 ordinary shares of œ1, and 2,000 deferred shares of ls; issued, •942,559 in 36,100 ordinary shares of œ1 fully paid, 2,000 deferred shares of ls fully paid, and 906,359 Shansi shares fully paid. Shansi shares were issued to finance both the Shansi and Honan concessions. The company’s paid-up capital was written down in 1937 (from œ1.54 million to œ828,548) and again in 1956; in 1961 it lost its historical identity to become the Anglo-Continental Investment & Finance Co. Ltd. [1] BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY, Second Series, Volume Nineteen, 1990. Copyfight (c) 1990 by the Business History Conference. ISSN 0849-6825. 113
This essay will focus on the history of the two concessions, the Syndicate’s only significant direct investment in China. 3 Development and Disappointment, The Concessions Under the Original Agreements, 1898-1914 Unfortunately the Syndicate was forced to delay its initial plans for the exploitation of its concessions: the Boxer Uprising in 1900 and subsequent flooding in the mines and other technical problems delayed production until 1905, by which time local opposition based on the principles of “rights recovery” and fuelled by returned students as supplemented by the desire of the new “entry,” that is of merchant–as opposed to traditional scholar-gentry–to mine the minerals themselves, made the conccssious inoperable in notoriously anti-foreign Shansi and manageable in neighboring Honan only after major revisions. The agreements contained a clause making actual mining subject to a permit for each site; the permit was to bc issued by the governor provided local conditions remained suitable [6, Art. I]. Thus the justification for refusal appeared to frightened Manchu governors as self-evident; granting a permit would lead they claimed–correctly as it turned out–to revolution. The Syndicate, supported by the British Minister, Sir John Jordan, unsympathetically stressed that part of the article which called on the governors to issue permits without ”any delay.” In the several years of discussions which followed, the Peking authorities, under pressure to honor agreements duly authorized and registered–but with which they no longer necessarily agreed–proved unable to force their demands on the provinces. Typically, the Tsungli Yamcn urged rcncgotiating and compromise in circumstances rendered more complex by the fact that the agreements wcrc in two langnagcs, the translations wcrc contested, and neither version had bccn designated official [2, FO 371/26, f. 192]. As for the provinces, and especially Shansi, they tested virtually every apparent defect in the agreements. The shallowness of their arguments indicated the fact that the post-Boxer Shansi provincial authorities, reflecting articulate public opinion, would under no circumstances sanction the development of mineral resources by foreigners. Indeed, the authorities in cooperation with the gentry took specific steps to block the Syndicate’s activities [3; 5, pp. 68-69]. The Syndicate was advised to accept the inevitable; in 1908 Shansi, in what the gentry considered an unwarranted gesture, reluctantly agreed to redemption as opposed to abrogation, the amount, Taels 2.75 million (approximately •350,000), which satisfied neither party, being intended as a reflection of direct costs, not as a compensation for rights forgone. 3The Syndicate’s railroad, the 90-mile Honan Railway, was sold to the Chinese in return for bonds-the œ800,000, 5% Honan Railway (Gold) Loan of 1905 [4, vol. II, p. 244].
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Pekin Syndicate,
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